Turkey on the mercy of Saudi Arabia
When Turkey went too far-
Turkish President Erdogan traveled to Saudi Arabia on Thursday, his first visit there since Saudi agents in Istanbul killed Saudi critic & journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, sparking a deep, years-long rift between the two governments. The visit marks the latest in Ankara’s bridge-building efforts with its key regional rival. This is Erdogan’s first visit to the kingdom since 2017, the year before the murder in Turkey of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents. The 59-year-old Washington Post and Middle East Eye columnist Khashoggi, who'd written columns critical of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for The Washington Post, was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 2 October 2018, in a mysterious murder that shocked the world. But now Erdogan has sought to mend relations with the Saudis as he searches for ways to ease a crippling economic crisis, which was worsened by an unofficial Saudi boycott of Turkish goods.
Erdogan’s office made no advance announcement of the visit. At an airport in Istanbul, before he departed, Erdogan told reporters his trip “will open the doors to a new era of our relations. Around 40,000 of our citizens live in Saudi Arabia with the businesses that they have established and are making a contribution to the Saudi economy.
Erdogan, who called Khashoggi a friend, once led a global charge to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for the 2018 murder, accusing the “highest levels” of the Saudi government of responsibility. A CIA released a year ago said Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had approved the operation to kill or capture Khashoggi, but the Saudi government has denied any involvement by the crown prince and rejects the report's findings. Saudi officials have blamed the killing on operatives who went rogue. For MBS, it's all about Khashoggi. He is obsessed with it. It's personal,". He blames Erdogan personally for getting America involved, and for not closing the affair down within the first few days. In the days and weeks after the murder in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Erdogan was relentless in abusing the kingdom, first demanding that the Saudis prove their assertions that Khashoggi had left the consulate alive, and later, that they identify the location of the journalists remains, which have never been found. “Where is Khashoggi’s body?” Erdogan wrote in November 2018 op-ed published in The Washington Post. “Who gave the order to kill this kind soul? Unfortunately, the Saudi authorities have refused to answer those questions.”
Turkey issued arrest warrants for Saudi officials implicated in the killing of Khashoggi, who was a contributing columnist to The Post. It started prosecuting Saudi murder suspects in absentia, in proceedings held in public — while criticizing a parallel trial held in Saudi Arabia behind closed doors. Erdogan scolded the United States as well, accusing the Trump administration of withholding information that would shed light on the case. Erdogan’s reaction was partly seen as a pique at a foreign government for carrying out such a brazen act in Turkey. But it was also in keeping with the Erdogan’s confrontational stance toward regional rivals like Saudi Arabia when Ankara was vying for influence around the Middle East ( It wanted to become the messiah of the ottoman empire)
Turkey’s support for organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood initially spurred the break with Arab governments that saw the group’s vision of political Islam as a threat. Later developments, particularly the blockade of Turkish ally Qatar by its Gulf Arab neighbors, reinforced the split. The lifting of the embargo by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain early last year paved the way for reconciliation with Qatar, though relations remained sour with Turkey.
Erdogan also seemed to have little affection for Mohammed, the young crown prince, who had referred to Turkey as part of a regional “triangle of evil” along with Iran and Islamist groups. Some speculated that the Turkish leader was trying to drive a wedge between the crown prince and his father, King Salman, and to sideline the young leader. But Mohammed has only grown stronger since the killing, having consolidated his position in Saudi Arabia. And Turkey’s economic problems have gotten worse, marked by a sagging currency and runaway inflation.
Turkey’s diplomatic drive has coincided with its worst economic crisis in two decades, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and now the war in Ukraine. When compared to a year earlier, energy imports jumped 156 percent to reach $8.4 billion. Turkey’s trade deficit reached $8.24 billion in March, as a result of skyrocketing energy prices. Unemployment stands at 11.2 percent. Geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine are overpowering the government’s plans to support the lira with a substantial current-account surplus in 2022. The quarterly deficit stood at $26.48 billion, 138 percent wider than the corresponding period a year earlier. Exports surged an estimated 20 percent to reach $22.7 billion, while imports increased 31 percent to reach $30.9 billion. When compared to a year earlier, energy imports jumped 156 percent to reach $8.4 billion. Together, the losses and high energy prices pushed Turkey’s inflation last month to a two-decade high of over 61 percent. In addition, the national currency, the lira, has plummeted, falling 44% in value against the dollar in 2021.
Turkey met one of the key Saudi demands in repairing relations earlier this month by deciding to hand the Khashoggi trial to Saudi Arabia, a case involving 26 suspects linked to his killing. Earlier this month, Turkey dropped the trial of 26 Saudis suspected of involvement in the killing of Khashoggi,- clearing the way for Thursday’s visit by Erdogan. Over the past year, Ankara has embarked on a diplomatic push to reset relations with countries such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia after years of antagonism following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings.
Hatice Cengiz, the fiancee of Jamal Khashoggi, talks to the media outside Justice Palace, the Caglayan Courthouse, in Istanbul on April 7 after attending a trial on the killing of Khashoggi. “Today is a dark day for those who have spent more than three years campaigning for justice for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi,” Agnès Callamard, the secretary-general of Amnesty International, said in a statement after Turkey’s justice minister announced his intention to halt the Turkish case. What has happened to Turkey’s declared commitment that justice must prevail for this gruesome murder and that this case would never become a pawn in political calculations and interests?
In addition to the Turkish case, there remains a second lawsuit in a US federal court filed by Hatice Cengiz, Khashoggi’s fiancee, and the US-based advocacy group Democracy for the Arab World Now, which Khashoggi established and ran before his death. Turkey says that this lawsuit is beyond its reach.
So although, Ankara-Riyadh relations worsened significantly after the killing, Turkey has since sought to mend ties with Saudi Arabia as part of a new regional policy to bolster its economy
So why the U-turn?
The short answer is that Turkey needs all the friends it can get right now as runaway inflation and a currency crisis threaten its economic stability. An ailing economy has brought Erdogan down from the soapbox, as he comes to Riyadh with outstretched palms. Turkey will also hold national elections around this time next year, which means Erdogan has little time to prove he remains the right person to steer the economy. Ankara has already been busy in the Middle East this year, striking a deal with Abu Dhabi in January that amounted to a $5 billion boost for Turkey’s currency reserves. In February, Erdogan received a fanfare welcome in the UAE as Dubai’s Burj Khalifa was lit up with the Turkish flag and Turkey’s national anthem blared out. In past months, Turkey secured a $4.9 billion currency swap deal with Abu Dhabi, following similar agreements with Qatar, China, and South Korea. The UAE also announced a $10 billion fund to support investments in Turkey. Turkey and the UAE repaired ties last year after nearly 10 years, with Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi also now reconciled with Turkey’s ally Qatar.
Erdogan will hope for similar largesse from Riyadh. Amid the reconciliation attempts, Turkey's exports to Saudi Arabia jumped by 25 percent in the first quarter of 2022, data shared by the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly indicated. Turkish exports reached nearly $70m in the first three months of this year, from an equivalent of $55m last year. The bulk of the exports occurred in March, increasing to $58m from $18.5m, a 215 percent increase year on year. Even though the amount is tiny compared to past figures, with Turkey in January 2020 alone exporting $221m worth of goods to Saudi Arabia, it may be a sign that Riyadh is easing its shadow import embargo on Ankara after months-long, behind-the-door talks and some Turkish reconciliation steps.
In fact, the Gulf region was the most dependable and aggressive investor in Turkey over the last few decades because of the opportunities in the financial sector, technology sector, industrial sector, and construction and real estate sectors. In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), the Gulf represents 7 percent of Turkey’s FDI today. In comparison, the United States—a much larger economy—represents a similar amount: 8 percent of Turkey’s FDI. While the political disagreements impacted FDI, the overall impact was not severe, as Qatar increased its investments in Turkey during this period, somewhat blunting the decline from the UAE. The UAE’s recent investments have given the green light to private sector companies eager to reengage in Turkey’s vast economy.
The longer explanation for Erdogan’s trip brings us back to the Arab Spring, when Turkey and Saudi Arabia were on opposing sides of the debate over the future of the Middle East, with Ankara promoting Islamist democracy along the lines of the Muslim Brotherhood and Erdogan’s own Justice and Development Party (AKP), while Riyadh backed the authoritarian and monarchical status quo. Erdogan’s fury over Khashoggi’s killing is best understood through this lens.
If the decision to turn over the Khashoggi case back to the Saudis is a political decision, so was the decision to make it a cause on the part of Ankara,”. With Saudi Arabia’s ruling model triumphant more than a decade after the Arab uprisings and Riyadh’s blockade of Turkish ally Qatar over, it appears pragmatism is winning out over ideology. The rapprochement can be seen as part of a wider trend across the Middle East, where U.S. retrenchment is causing countries to reassess their relationships. That can be seen in Israel’s warming ties with Arab nations following the Abraham Accords, the political rehabilitation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Qatar’s return to the Gulf fold, and even normalization talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Erdogan’s arrival in Riyadh also speaks to Saudi Arabia’s endurance, with the kingdom able to weather the Arab Spring, disastrous war in Yemen, the global backlash to Khashoggi’s killing, and the arrival of a less agreeable White House under President Joe Biden with relative ease. Russia’s war in Ukraine appears to have strengthened the Saudi hand further. The knock-on effect on oil prices means the country will see its first budget surplus since 2013, economic growth is expected to reach at least 7.6 percent this year, and its stock market is the sixth-best performing worldwide. So far, Saudi Arabia has rebuffed U.S. calls to pump more oil to keep prices down and undercut Russia’s economy. Washington might make more headway if it offered something more concrete in return, such as broad regional security guarantees.
Washington has always remained a key player in the Middle East, but the United States administration under President Joe Biden prioritized East Asia, focused on its own domestic matters, and has pushed away diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the previous Donald Trump administration. In the meantime, the U.S. has started reevaluating its military forces in the region. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not be part of the Saudi intervention in Yemen, and Washington may go back to the nuclear deal with Iran. These changes triggered and pushed Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and the UAE towards a de-escalation process. On the other hand, Russia's growing influence and the U.S.'s decreasing engagement in the region pushed Turkey to act to balance the two.